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ABSTRACT 
Scholarly treatments of the controversial German jurist Carl tend to be bipolar: His writings are 
either scrutinized for totalitarian leanings or his flirtations with Nazism excused as unfortunately 
opportunistic.  One of the more fruitful points to begin an exploration of Schmitt’s thought is in 
his interpretation of Thomas Hobbes.  Schmitt criticized Hobbes both for ignoring the historical 
backdrop to the Leviathan myth, and also for prefiguring liberalism with his distinction between 
conscience and obedience.  In recruiting Hobbes, this paper suggests that though Schmitt’s 
concern about the technologization of politics through liberalism was paramount, it was in 
support of a radical form of democracy.  Schmitt appropriates Hobbes’ state of nature and the 
initial founding contract to show the ‘people’ are sovereign, and therefore the only entity capable 
of politically distinguishing between friends and enemies.  This critique intends to move beyond 
Schmitt the anti-liberal, to show him as a democrat, albeit one who retains subtle authoritarian 
undertones. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
The thesis of this paper is that Carl Schmitt was a radical democrat influenced by Thomas 
Hobbes.  Schmitt was a German jurist and political theorist influential during the Weimar and 
National Socialist regimes in Germany, who espoused the politics of the exceptional situation, 
those events which are neither explicitly nor implicitly accounted for by the constitution.  The 
exception exposes who is sovereign because the sovereign is the only one who decides on the 
existence, the exception and the steps needed to end it.  
 Schmitt’s legal reasoning on the sovereign, by some accounts, assisted in the downfall of 
the Weimar Republic and marked the ascendancy of Hitler and the National Socialist state.  He 
took up a political post with the new regime under the protection of Herman Goering.  During his 
tenure, he justified some of the most egregious crimes committed by the Nazis. 
 Even with these imprudent affiliations, Schmitt is worth studying, for among other 
things, his concept of radical democracy.  By radical democracy, Schmitt means a return to the 
essence of the political, which is rooted in the collectivity of a particular people.  The political as 
an identity exists, for Schmitt, when such a collectivity determines who are its friends and 
enemies.  Once this initial identity is made, the group chooses a form of government to adopt.  
At this point, it transforms into a state. 
 Schmitt uses Hobbes both to engineer his primordial form of politics, and also to bolster 
his critique of the liberal features of the modern democratic state.  Schmitt proceeds from 
Hobbes’ conception of the state of nature to show how a group of people can come together to 
enhance their security.  These people then choose a sovereign who guarantees them protection 
from enemies and demands in return their unconditional obedience.  Schmitt then argues that the 
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liberal right to conscience undermines the unity and security of the state by encouraging the 
growth of hidden groups.  These groups by themselves are not political, but they harness the 
legislative process to achieve desirable political results.  In so doing, these hidden groups 
pursuing special interests obstruct the people from wielding their original sovereignty.  
Hamstrung by feuds among these groups, the state quits being the bearer of the identity of the 
people and the guardian of their security.  Instead it becomes a playground of conflicting 
interests and a mechanism operating at the behest of the most powerful group. 
 This project is divided into two parts.  The first part examines Schmitt’s criticism of 
Hobbes’ Leviathan.  It compares Schmitt’s analysis to other thinkers and shows how Schmitt 
tackles Hobbes in a concrete sense, not merely as a philosopher, but as a thinker concerned with 
the world as it exists.  Schmitt decries “the superficial labeling of Hobbes as a rationalist, 
mechanist, sensualist, individualist, or any other ‘ist.’”  Instead in his reckoning, Schmitt sees 
“[Hobbes] as a theorist of political action who takes pains to present a political reality and whose 
writings are political action tracts, not systems of thought about general concepts.”1 
 This part also looks at Schmitt’s separation of the leviathan into three symbols: a mortal 
god, a sovereign representative and a machine.  In Schmitt’s view, while Hobbes used the 
symbol of the mortal god for rhetorical purposes, the leviathan as sovereign representative was a 
symbol viable in the age of princes and constitutional monarchies.  The leviathan as machine was 
a product of its epoch, the age of technicity.  The conclusion of part one charts how the leviathan 
changed historically and legally from the sovereign-representative to a machine.  Schmitt argues 
that by distinguishing between public expression of belief and private conscience, Hobbes paved 
the way for the eventual rise of the mechanistic constitutional state. 
                                                          
1
 Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, 11.  All references hereafter will be LST. 
 3   
 
 The second part of this thesis integrates Schmitt’s analysis of the Leviathan with his own 
ideas on democracy.  The purpose of the integration is to reveal that Schmitt’s reliance on 
Hobbes is not limited to one text, and secondly to provide a link between similar themes related 
to democracy among Schmitt’s varied texts.  Schmitt’s radical democracy is contingent on his 
concept of the political and essential to his critique of liberalism and the constitutional state.  By 
elevating the individual above the collectivity, liberalism diminishes the essence of the radical 
democracy, the foundation of the state.  
 
Who is Carl Schmitt? 
Carl Schmitt is the Medusa of political theory.  Mere mention of his name halts discussion.  This 
is obviously an unsurprising development given his relationship with the rise of National 
Socialism in Germany.  Schmitt joined the National Socialist Party on May 1, 1933.  A month 
before he had already begun defending the new regime’s palace coup.  As a major player in the 
legal circles of the National Socialist state, Schmitt excoriated German thinkers and artists who 
fled abroad to escape torture or death, praised Hitler for preventing anarchy during the Rohm 
Putsch and suggested “that all writings by Jews should be taken out of circulation in libraries and 
put in a carefully guarded ‘Judiaca’ section.”  By 1936, Schmitt was out of favor with the Party, 
following sustained attacks on his commitment to the racial mission of National Socialism.
2
   
Despite Schmitt’s short time at the helm of legal affairs, those three years as a hack 
tarnish his legacy.  It is no wonder Schmitt’s enemies suspect his influence, so look to stop it, 
while his friends acknowledge their debt to him and yet maintain their distance.  Once described 
as “a mine that silently explodes,” he is also a scorching flame.  In a recent review of a legal 
                                                          
2
 Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 1800 – 2000, 268 – 270;  Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual 
Portrait of Carl Schmitt), 178 - 182, 202, 207. 
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policy text in The New York Times, Harvard professor Harvey Mansfield dismisses Schmitt with 
the tiniest of mentions.
3
  A book on Schmitt is colorfully titled A Dangerous Mind, another 
Theorist for the Reich.
4
  One need not suppose sentiments of this nature are merely the result of 
Schmitt’s flirtation with Nazism.  Other thinkers have dabbled in reprehensible political causes 
or supported destructive manifestos.  Paul de Man, Nishida Kitaro and Mircea Eliade are 
members of the rogues’ gallery, yet their legacies none the poorer for their associations.5   
It is possible for a brilliant thinker to subscribe to a questionable ideology.  However, if 
that is the case, one must begin by charging the thinker with imprudence, and only thereafter 
investigate the import of his thought.  This is where a study of Schmitt must begin.  There is no 
doubt Schmitt is guilty of unfortunate political allegiances, questionable racial doctrines and 
strident philosophical postures.  Nevertheless, these are incomplete supports on which to base an 
analysis of Schmitt’s worth.  Because his life, work and thought reject easy characterization, an 
engagement with Schmitt the political thinker must return to the works he wrote.  All other 
approaches are embellishments on this singular theme; they sniff at the penumbra without 
attacking the crux. 
 
Appraising Schmitt: A Literature Review 
Schmitt is acknowledged as one of the most important political thinkers to come out of twentieth 
century Germany.  His reputation rests on several key works published during the Weimar and 
National Socialist periods.  Political theorists are unsure of how to classify him.  To Guy Oakes, 
                                                          
3
 “My advice to the authors is, first, to toss out Schmitt from their construction; they don’t really believe (or know) 
him.”  Mansfield, Is the Imperial Presidency Inevitable? 
4
 Muller,  A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought;  Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist of 
the Reich. 
5
 Wiener, Professors, Politics and Pop, 16 – 22; Arisaka, Beyond ‘East and West’: Nishida’s Universalism and 
Post-Colonial Critique, 237 – 252.  
Manea, On Clowns: The Dictator and the Artist: Essays , 91 – 124. 
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Schmitt is a polemical writer who rose against the dominant positivistic jurisprudence of his 
time.
6
  Oakes maintains “Schmitt was the consummate prosecutorial thinker, and all his major 
works were developed as attempts to destroy positions he rejected.”  George Schwab sees 
Schmitt as the father of the idea of the total state, the friend-enemy criterion of politics, and the 
mutual negation of democracy and liberalism.  Elsewhere, Schwab explains that in his defense of 
the Weimar Republic, “Schmitt challenged a basic liberal assumption then widely held either for 
philosophical or tactical reasons, namely, that every political party, no matter how anti-
republican, must be permitted freely to compete for parliamentary representation and for 
governmental power.”7 
 Jurgen Habermas describes Schmitt as a very German thinker who evinces no interest in 
the analytic concept of political power.  To Habermas, Schmitt is a political theologian, not a 
social scientist interested in reviving “the concept of sovereign power in its full 
counterrevolutionary significance.  Habermas asserts Schmitt’s fascination is the aesthetics of 
violence.  Once Schmitt’s work is “Interpreted on the model of the creation ex nihilo, 
sovereignty acquires a halo of surrealistic meanings through its relationship to the violent 
destruction of the normative as such.”  On the other hand, Stephen Holmes cites Schmitt as a 
prominent anti-liberal heartbroken over the loss of the Reich in 1918.  Holmes links Schmitt’s 
Weimar writings to those from the Nazi period.  Holmes acknowledges that Schmitt is less a 
racist than a cultural anti-Semite, though his anti-Semitism is “integral to his thinking, not 
merely decorative or a matter of political opportunism.”  Moreover, “The task Schmitt set 
                                                          
6
 McCarthy, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, vii; Oakes Political Romanticism, xii. 
7
 Schwab, Political Theology, xxxvii; Schwab, The Concept of the Political, 13. 
 6   
 
himself as a political publicist who was to free the German spirit from its fatal attachment to a 
nefarious bourgeois constitutionalism imposed from abroad.”8  
Mark Lilla considers Schmitt an “aging apocalyptic thinker,” in addition to being a 
practitioner of “the politics of theological despair.”  An unorthodox Catholic thinker determined 
to reverse the modern liberal age, Schmitt’s “theological speculations are an entirely homemade 
brew of modern existentialism and pre-modern heresies that the Church suppressed centuries 
ago.”  His “romanticizing of Catholic institutions, his praise of Mussolini, his attempts to salvage 
democratic legitimacy from the legalism of the Weimar system, and his work for Hitler, while 
not consistent, reflect a willingness to encourage any force that might do battle against the 
secularized liberal age.”  Heinrich Meier declares, “Carl Schmitt cannot be adequately grasped if 
one does not grasp the center and the context of his thought as political theology.”  And by 
political theology, Meier indicates that Schmitt’s primary resource of knowledge is founded in 
revelation, and not reason.  Meier further explains political theology as “a position that can be 
grasped in no other way than by thinking it to the point – both aiming at and starting from that 
point – at which this position, in accordance with its own claim or confession, commands 
thinking to stop.”9 
 Tracy Strong argues that Schmitt accepts the legitimacy of democracy, by which Strong 
means Schmitt is no counter-revolutionary.  Instead, Schmitt’s concern is retaining the human in 
politics; anything else added distorts its essence.  “Those who would elaborate a set of rules by 
which decisions can be made take human life out of politics: Schmitt is concerned to keep them.”  
For Kam Shapiro, Schmitt intends to supplant the legally bound society with an executive 
capable of molding and directing disparate groups within the state.  William Scheuerman focuses 
                                                          
8
 Habermas, The Horrors of Autonomy, 128 – 130, 137; Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, 37 – 38, 50. 
9
 Lilla, The Enemy of Liberalism, 8 – 10;  Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt, xiii – xiv, xviii. 
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on Schmitt’s attempt to solve the ‘crisis of legal indeterminacy’.  It was Schmitt’s search for an 
authoritarian alternative, which led to his misadventure with National Socialism.  Scheuerman 
believes that Schmitt’s critique of liberal jurisprudence is the clearest introduction to his thought.  
The theological aspersions now attached to Schmitt are further window-dressing to an elaborate 
legal-philosophical scheme fashioned by a difficult thinker.  “Schmitt was a relatively secular-
minded jurist, not a ‘political theologian’ concerned with waging an intellectual crusade against 
atheism.”  Scheuerman concedes, “Even though the current fashionable tendency in Germany to 
read Schmitt as a closet Catholic theologian has produced some illuminating results, it risks 
obfuscating the real significance of his ideas for contemporary political and legal theory.”10 
 
Schmitt and Hobbes: A Relationship 
As shown in the previous section, eclectic and passionate opinions abound regarding Schmitt’s 
writings.  If, as Oakes contends, Schmitt is a polemicist attacking in print hidden and exposed 
enemies, a good way to burrow into his thought will be through the authors he relies on to make 
philosophical points.
11
  In that case, the most recognizable and visible source associated with 
Schmitt is Thomas Hobbes.  At other times, and in several texts, Schmitt does refer to Donoso 
Cortes, Joseph de Maistre and Max Weber; but of them all, Hobbes is the thinker he identifies 
with and returns to, again and again.  Indeed, Hobbes’ influence on Schmitt has not gone 
unnoticed.  Given Schmitt’s understanding of the state as the provider of security and the 
symbiotic nexus of protection and obedience, Schwab contends “Schmitt deserves to be called 
the Hobbes of the twentieth century.”  Not to be outdone, Holmes dispels the implied cross-
                                                          
10
 Strong, Political Theology, xxv, xix; Shapiro, Carl Schmitt and the Intensification of Politics, 4;  Scheuerman, 
Carl Schmitt, The End of Law, 2 – 3.  
11
 Oakes, xii. 
 8   
 
fertilization between both men, noting “the conclusion that Schmitt is a modern disciple of 
Hobbes remains at best a half-truth.”12 
 Wherever one stands on the debate, if Hobbes serves as a weapon in Schmitt’s theoretical 
and rhetorical arsenals, then certain questions deserve to be asked?  Where, how and why is 
Hobbes appropriated by Schmitt and what are the possible consequences of the appropriation? 
 How Schmitt marshals Hobbes will be shared shortly, but a review of the literature on 
Hobbes’ political theory is in order.  Various thinkers are attracted to Hobbes for different 
reasons and they utilize him for different ends.  As Johan Tralau asserts “Interpretations of 
Hobbes are very often, of course, not just interpretations, but political choices.”13 
 
Situating Hobbes: A Literature Review 
In the standard textbook interpretation, George Sabine regards Hobbes as the first modern 
political theorist, one who imbues political thought with the nascent scientific principles of his 
time.  Sabine contends 
Political theory was only one part of what [Hobbes] designed to be an all-inclusive of 
philosophy formed from scientific principles.  The system would now be described as 
materialism. . . .  It suggested the revolutionary idea that the physical world is a purely 
mechanical system in which all that happens may be explained with geometrical precision 
by the displacement of bodies relative to another.
14
 
 
Hobbes, for Sabine, is an arch-individualist, an unabashed utilitarian and a cold-hearted 
rationalist, who considers all human behavior the result of individual self-interest.  It is self-
interest that drives man from the state of nature toward the security society provides.  
Paradoxically, Sabine also asserts Hobbes’ political writings were written to support absolute 
government, and more especially absolute monarchy. 
                                                          
12
 Schmitt, Donoso Cortes in Berlin, 87 – 99; Schwab, Political Theology, lii;  Holmes,  41. 
13
 Tralau, Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt, and Three Conceptions of Politics,  269. 
14
 Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 456 – 457, 467. 
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 In Eric Brandon’s analysis “The fact that Hobbes was a political absolutist is not an issue 
of serious debate.”  Hobbes intends to show that absolutism is the best form of government and 
even suggest ways to discover and identify the absolute sovereign in a state.  Brandon refers to 
the two halves of Leviathan as a stratagem by Hobbes, where he bases the first part on arguments 
from natural reason and the second part, on a materialistic scriptural exegesis.
15
  Brandon 
remarks that Hobbes’ materialism is the glue that holds the Leviathan together.  Of his recourse 
to Holy Scriptures, Brandon explains that “the point of Hobbes’ materialistic interpretation of the 
Bible is to eliminate the spiritual plane altogether in an effort to reduce the field of theological 
and philosophical dispute to the material world.”16  In the battle between king and pope, Hobbes 
pitches tent with monarchy. 
 Henry Rosenthal dismisses these appellations.  Hobbes’ secret, Rosenthal says: 
is that he is not a political philosopher; nor a mechanist-materialist; nor a royalist, that is 
to say, not a die-hard one; nor a philosopher of law, natural or unnatural, in the way in 
which these oblique contraries have been traditionally implied, nor a religio-political 
scientist of Euclidean method who eventually finds himself in equivocal advocacy of a 
‘divine polity; nor most of the several other roles imputed to him by the variety of learned 
and able commentators that he has had the benefit of.
17
 
 
Like a chameleon, Hobbes might have flashed various colors, but it was always in accord with 
the environment in which he found himself, and the audience he felt would read his work.  
Hobbes, rather, is a “radical egalitarian ontologist.”  Hobbes posits all men to be equal because 
of their very being, which is granted them by the state.  All talk of Hobbes’ state of nature is a 
fabrication, an intellectual fiction to justify the state that already exists.  Kinch Hoekstra agrees.  
As he notes, “Hobbes writes less to persuade the apolitical to institute commonwealth than to 
                                                          
15
 Brandon, The Coherence of Hobbes’ Leviathan, 1 – 3.  He explains Hobbes’ materialism “relies on the 
foundational premises that bodies are the only things that exist and that all change comes about through the motion 
of bodies.”   
16
 Brandon, 18 – 19, 63. 
17
 Rosenthal, The Consolations of Philosophy: Hobbes’ Secret, Spinoza’s Way, 31. 
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exhort those who are already citizens to a punctilious obedience.  Salvation is already theirs; they 
need only to embrace it.”  By Rosenthal’s sense, Hobbes cannot be considered a political 
philosopher, if it means a thinker “whose ideas, such as they are, one can develop an 
architectural rendering, if not a blueprint, of the actual, conceivable workings of a political 
community, large or small.”18  
 Geoffey Vaughan maintains that there is a practical side to Hobbes.  A political 
philosopher of merit, Hobbes is concerned with strengthening the foundations of created states.  
Therefore, “Hobbes’ philosophy, if it is to have a practical effect, must secure those states that 
already exist.  Stabilizing existing governments without tinkering with the institutions of 
government is a very different task.”  Because tampering with the form of government is the root 
cause of dissension and civil war, Hobbes dare not suggest overt changes to the present state.  
Rather, Vaughan introduces Hobbes as a political educator who prevents social discord, instilling 
obedience to the sovereign within the recalcitrant people.
 
After all, everyone chafes at authority, 
especially when a victim of it.  Hobbes’ exposes why the sovereign requires a strong hand.  To 
pacify secessionist doctrines, “the people must be educated in the new politics; they must be 
taught their place in the commonwealth.”19  
 Leo Strauss undermines the identification of Hobbes as a mechanist or materialist.  A 
careful reading shows that “The foundations of Hobbes’ political philosophy, that is the moral 
attitude to which it owes its existence and its unity, are objectively as well as biographically 
‘prior’ to the mathematical scientific founding and presentation of that philosophy.”  Strauss 
assumes that “Hobbes’ political philosophy is the first peculiarly modern attempt to give a 
coherent and exhaustive answer to the question of man’s right life, which is at the same time the 
                                                          
18
 Rosenthal 35, 42; Hoekstra, Hobbes on the Natural Condition of Mankind, 113. 
19
 Vaughan, Behemoth teaches Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Political Education, 12, 31, 36 – 37. 
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question of the right order of society.”  According to Strauss, Hobbes grounds his political theory 
on natural right – an unsubstantiated, subjective claim – instead of natural law of the ancients – 
an objective political order.  Fear of violent death among individuals in a state is their natural 
right.  By affirming this right, Hobbes merges both democratic and monarchical traditions.
20
  The 
result: all political legitimacy comes from the unity of the sovereign people, yet this sovereignty 
is actualized through a monarchy. 
What these varied, opposed and powerful examinations of Hobbes show, is how his 
thought can be folded to fit into many philosophical boxes.  Hobbes is a prêt-à-porter thinker.  
At one time he can be a materialist, mechanist, except when he is not.  In other situations, he is a 
monarchist, individualist, theist, atheist, authoritarian, absolutist or liberal.  Schmitt is no 
different from these interpreters.  The next session proposes to find out how Schmitt deploys 
Hobbes in The Leviathan.   
 
Making Sense of Hobbes’ “Leviathan” 
Schmitt begins The Leviathan by noting that the leviathan, as a symbol, is of greater renown than 
the actual contents of Hobbes’ text.  Even those who lack an intimate knowledge of the treatise 
recognize the image.  Schmitt believes that it is notorious because “The leviathan is not just any 
‘corpus’ or just any kind of beast, it is an image from the Hebrew Bible, one garbed during the 
course of many centuries in mythical, theological and cabbalistic meanings.”21  Hobbes pitches 
the image in a different context.  In a passage on punishment and rewards, Hobbes proclaims to: 
have set forth the nature of man, whose and other passions have compelled him to submit 
himself to government, together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared 
to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the last two verses of the one and fortieth of 
                                                          
20
 Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 5, 170, 1, viii, 65. 
21
 LST 6. 
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Job, where God, having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth him King of the 
Proud.
22
 
 
Schmitt goes beyond Hobbes’ citation.  He reveals the mythological historical origin of 
the beasts as originally Babylonian and Syrian legends.  Schmitt is interested in two exegeses of 
the leviathan relating to Christian and Jewish mythologies.
23
  The Church Fathers explained that 
the leviathan is the devil overcome.  In this narration, God is a fisherman, Christ the bait on a 
cross, and the leviathan, a gigantic fish hooked on the bait.  At Calvary, God-as-man defeated the 
‘hater of mankind,’ enticing him with the lure of the bait.24  
According to Schmitt, the Jewish representation of the leviathan dwells on the “heathen 
world powers that were hostile to the Jews.”  Schmitt attributes these interpretations to cabbalists 
who envision the end of world history as a battle among heathen.  The Jews as the only survivors 
gather to eat the flesh of those slaughtered.  Heathen writers later appropriate these cabbalist 
interpretations, which unbeknownst to them retain a dependence on eschatology.  With such 
historical background before and beyond the biblical mention in Job, Schmitt wonders, “whether 
Hobbes, who is considered the ‘prophet of the leviathan’ has in this connection, and with this 
symbol staked out a clear and definite position.”25   
This is a worthwhile inquiry.  Hobbes makes only four references to leviathan:  the first is 
the frontispiece image of the book, while the other three are references within the text.  Yet these 
scant mentions turn out to be the title of Hobbes’ book, as well as the object of attack by his 
critics.  Schmitt unravels Hobbes’ ‘clear and definite position’ by attending to each allusion. 
                                                          
22
 Hobbes, Leviathan, 210.  
23
 Mastnak, Schmitt’s Behemoth, 279.  Tomaz Mastnak alerts us to the possible consequences of Schmitt’s 
interpretation. “My impression is that Schmitt only needed a specter of ‘Christian interpretation’ of Leviathan and 
Behemoth as the foil to a specter of ‘Jewish interpretation’, and that he construed both for political reasons.” 
24
 LST  6 – 8. 
25
 LST 10;  Untea, Leviathan and his Prophet: a Biblical Monster turned into Political Messiah.  Ionut Untea 
provides some biblical exegesis of the leviathan, which goes beyond Hobbes’ singular reference to Job.  
Downloaded at:  
<http://inter-disciplinary.net/ati/Monsters/M6/untea%20paper.pdf>  
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   Schmitt starts his analysis with a look at the copperplate engraving on the first English 
edition of the book.
26
  In it is an image of a gigantic man, composed of innumerable, 
indistinguishable midgets, pressed together in solid form.  The giant has a sword in the right 
hand and a crosier in the left.  Below each arm is a column of five drawings, which depict 
spiritual and secular authority.  Given that Hobbes refuses to dwell on the import of his 
illustration, the image has given rise to varied interpretations.  For Schmitt, “These illustrations 
represent the characteristic means of using authority and power to wage secular-spiritual 
disputes.  The political battle, with its inevitable and incessant friend-enemy disputes that 
embrace every sphere of human activity, brings to the fore on both sides specific weapons.”  
Though these weapons are not interchangeable, they are wielded by the same person.  To the 
degree that the giant loses control of either weapon, to the same degree the giant loses power to 
fight and maintain order.  What Hobbes reveals in his frontispiece is “that ideas and distinctions 
are political weapons, in fact, specific weapons of wielding ‘indirect power.’”  As Schmitt points 
out, the drawing shown in Hobbes’ text does not match popular depictions of the leviathan.  
Instead of a deadly serpent, a massive sea monster or a terrifying dragon, Hobbes envisions 
leviathan as a huge man.  Indeed, the powerful imagery evoked overshadows the book’s 
content.
27
  
Hobbes’ first textual reference occurs when he declares, “By art is created that great 
Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State (in Latin Civitas), which is but an artificial man, 
though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defense it was 
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intended.”  Earlier in his text, Hobbes asks, “Seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning 
whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that 
move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life?”28  With this 
query Hobbes equates the Commonwealth or Leviathan with automata, insofar as it is an 
artificial man exhibiting characteristics of artificial life.  By combining the frontispiece with 
these statements from Hobbes, Schmitt identifies the Leviathan as comprising three images of a 
huge animal, a huge man and a huge machine.
29
 
Hobbes’ second mention of the leviathan is in Book II, Chapter 17, when he constructs 
his origin of the state.  A covenant of consenting individuals designates a representative who 
elevates individuals to a unified person, which combined is the state.  Once the covenant occurs, 
The multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth, in Latin Civitas.  This 
is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak reverently) of that Mortal God 
to which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defense.  For by this authority, 
given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much 
power and strength conferred on him that by terror thereof he is enabled to conform the 
wills of them all to peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad.  And in 
him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth . . . .  And he that carrieth this person is 
called Sovereign, and said to have Sovereign Power, and every one besides, his subject.
30
 
 
With the addition of a mortal god, Schmitt now attributes the symbol, as conceived by Hobbes, 
to be a totality of god, man, animal and machine 
 The final allusion to the leviathan occurs in Chapter 28.  Hobbes quotes from Job 41: 33, 
“Upon the earth there is not his like.”  To which Schmitt comments, “The explanation is brief 
and does not correspond to the great expectations that a mythical blending of god and animal, 
animal and man, and man and machine evokes.”31  The same could be said of Schmitt’s exegesis. 
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 The reliability of Schmitt’s analysis of the leviathan as a symbol rests on a resolution of 
Hobbes’ diversions.  Given the varied feints Hobbes consciously discharges, Schmitt determines 
Hobbes’ usage of leviathan to be a literary idea conceived in English humor.  Schmitt also notes:  
“A textual examination of the meaning of leviathan in Hobbes’ Leviathan reveals that the 
leviathan is an efficacious citation from the Bible, illustrating, by means of an animal, the 
strongest temporal power, whose overarching strength keeps all the weaker ones in check.  The 
meaning of the image seems to be limited to the utility of the concept.”32   
 As will be explained below, Schmitt intends to show that Hobbes’ leviathan fails on two 
levels.  The first is because the machine overthrows the mortal god and the second, because 
Hobbes is unaware of the weight of the leviathan myth.  It is Schmitt’s contention that by 
adopting a political myth, Hobbes invoked all its elements, those seen or unseen.
33
  Schmitt 
maintains that even if Hobbes appropriated the leviathan for the notoriety of its imagery, it 
nevertheless remains a fixture of his state theory and must be accounted for as such.  The next 
section returns to Schmitt’s analysis of the Hobbesian state, the entity designated as the 
leviathan. 
 
Schmitt’s Analysis of Hobbes’ State Theory 
Schmitt’s conclusion from the previous section warrants a question: If Hobbes limits the 
leviathan to its utility as a concept, then how does it fit within Hobbes’ state theory?  Schmitt 
starts his analysis by identifying the foundation of Hobbes’ state theory as the fear of the state of 
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nature.  The terminus of the theory is the security of the civil, stately condition.
34
  Hobbes 
describes the state of nature as a time when men are equal in “faculties of body and mind.”  Of 
course, men of different sizes and intellects exist but it is possible for the weak or less intelligent 
to band together temporarily to defeat a stronger or wiser foe.  This equality means all men can 
potentially obtain the ends they want.  However, it also means the possibility of enjoying that 
end is minimal because resources are scarce.   
With this equality of means, scarcity of ends, struggle for reputation, and anxiety for 
safety, men are engaged in a state of war.  Hence every man is against everyone else.  But this 
war resides not only in the fighting, but more importantly includes the tendency toward it.  “For 
war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to 
contend by battle is sufficiently known . . . .  All other time is peace.”  During a state of war, 
moreover, nothing can be unjust.  All notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, legality 
and illegality have no place because there is no law.  Indeed, “Force and fraud are in war the two 
cardinal virtues.”35  Contrary to the classical philosophers, Hobbes maintains that the Summum 
Bonum is meaningless.  As man is always in motion, his senses in flux, his imagination strident, 
the greatest good implies a summit, a point at which there is a cessation of pleasure.  To Hobbes 
a cessation of any sort is death.  Consequently, there is “A general inclination of all mankind, a 
perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death.”  It is this desire for 
power, this hankering after ease, a fear of death, which makes solitary men disposed to obeying a 
common power.  Such men come to recognize the impossibility of securing their ease and safety 
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alone.  Terrified of oppression, of sudden, violent death, these men seek aid from each other, 
which is the origin of society.
36
  
Schmitt maintains that it is the terror of the state of nature which drives anguished 
individuals together and with their fear in extremis “a spark of reason flashes and suddenly there 
stands in front of them a new god.”  Hobbes has finally set up the conditions for a shift away 
from the state of nature.  He asserts, “It is manifest that during the time men live without a 
common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war.”37  Only 
in the presence of a common, awe-inspiring power can there be peace.  
Schmitt contends that Hobbes’ mortal god can be viewed in three distinct ways.  The god 
can be (a) “the notorious mythical leviathan, that has assimilated god, man, animal, and 
machine,” or (b) a “juristically constructed covenant to explain the appearance of one sovereign 
person brought about by representation” or, finally, (c) the transfer of “the Cartesian conception 
of man as a mechanism with a soul onto the ‘huge man,’ the state, made by him into a machine 
animated by the sovereign-representation.”  Given that Hobbes’ mortal god can be the leviathan, 
the sovereign representative, or the dreadful machine of state, Schmitt advances “That the state is 
characterized as ‘god’ has no particular meaning in Hobbes’ construction of the state.”  
Obviously, it does not mean that it is completely useless as a rhetorical device.  Schmitt intimates 
that it would be a tactical blunder for Hobbes, as a defender of the rights of the state against the 
pope, to cede divinity to his opponents.
38
  
 Hobbes, meanwhile, turns divinity on its head with his justification of the state.  He 
grants divinity to the state because it is sovereign and omnipotent.  In Schmitt’s interpretation, 
the state no longer receives sovereignty from the divine.
 
  Indeed, “Because state power is 
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supreme, it possesses divine character.  But its omnipotence is not at all divinely derived: it is a 
product of human work and comes about because of a ‘covenant’ entered into by man.”39  
Schmitt distinguishes Hobbes’ theory from those of classical and medieval thinkers: 
Hobbes’ god is transcendent only in a juristic sense, not in a metaphysical sense.  The state is not 
a man, but a machine and in no conceivable way can a machine be metaphysically transcendent.  
In its historical import, Hobbes’ state, Schmitt declares, “may even be regarded as the first 
product in the age of technology.”  Schmitt adds, “With that state was created not only an 
essential intellectual or sociological precondition for the technical-industrial age that followed, 
but also the typical, even prototypical, work of the new technological era – the development of 
the state itself.”  Even if the sovereign-representative is the soul of the state, its body is a 
machine, which means that the state flourishes as a homo artificialis – a construct whose maker 
and material are men.  “The leviathan thus becomes none other than a huge machine, a gigantic 
mechanism in the service of ensuring the physical protection of those governed.”40 
The result of this mechanization is the general neutralization of truths and the 
transformation of the state into a technical, neutral instrument.  Schmitt here refers to all forms of 
truth, about existence, politics, morality, religion essences and concepts.  Any advocacy of a 
position, especially one based on its inherent truth, could serve as the site for the possible 
eruption of war.
41
  As such, those positions are relegated to facts or subjective knowledge which 
only ends up creating disputes.  Of this tendency toward neutralization, Schmitt notes, 
The decisive first step in the process occurred in one century that was filled to the point of 
despair and nausea with religious and theological strife, disputes and bloody wars.  After 
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a century of fruitless theological strife in which each party defamed the other and none 
managed to convince the other, the endeavor to find a neutral territory in which it would 
be possible to arrive at an understanding or reach a compromise leading to security and 
order is utterly comprehensible.  At first, the search for foundations and order was 
centered in ‘natural’ metaphysics, whose foundations and concepts were clear to everyone 
and whose mathematical accuracy was supposed to have been demonstrated by proof.
42
 
 
The state then uses religious, metaphysical and political distinctions as artificial 
constructs, like an efficient computer spitting out results regardless of the quality of input data.  
The state serves as a machine for both Western liberals and Bolshevist Marxists.  As a tool, it “is 
independent of every political goal and conviction and assumes a value-and-truth neutrality of a 
technical instrument.”43  
At this point, the state emphasizes neutrality through laws issued as commands, instead 
of pursuing truth and justice.  According to Schmitt, Hobbes’ dictum Auctoritas non Veritas 
“thus becomes a simple, objective expression of value-and-truth neutral, positivism – technical 
thinking that separates the religious and metaphysical standards of truth from standards of 
command and function and renders them autonomous.”  Hence, a technical neutral state can be 
tolerant or intolerant, religious or agnostic, just or unjust.  Regardless of its choice, at any 
instance, the state remains neutral.  As the state possesses no content independent of its technical 
perfection, it maintains order only as long as the status quo is undisturbed.  No other basis exists 
to define truth.  After all, as Schmitt deftly points out, “everyone claims that right and truth is on 
his side.  But the assertion of right does not lead to peace.  Instead, it is designed to contravene 
the decisions of a well-functioning legal force that was created to end strife.”44  
While this situation described by Schmitt appears bleak, it is precisely the form and role 
of the state that Hobbes envisions.  Hobbes is explicit in tying the notion of justice to the 
                                                          
42
 LST 43. 
43
 LST 42. 
44
 LST 45. 
 20   
 
commonwealth through an appeal to covenants.  Hobbes says, “Before the names of just and 
unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the 
performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they 
expect by the breach of their covenant . . . .  and such power there is none before the erection of a 
commonwealth.”45  The leviathan is set up to provide peace and security for individuals within 
the commonwealth.  In furtherance of this goal, all means to achieve this end are considered 
good.  The sovereign must, therefore, not only be police, but also censor. 
Schmitt shows how the machine overthrows the mortal god.  He identifies the absence of 
a right to resistance in the Hobbesian state as the seed of that failure.  Given that a state exists to 
maintain order and peace, and is the sole and highest lawgiver, its laws, as commands, must be 
obeyed or it falls apart.  “Against the irresistible, overpowering leviathan state which subjugates 
all law to its commands, there exists neither a discernible stance nor a resistance.”46 
According to Schmitt’s account, Hobbes provides an escape route for those who are 
unable to resist the sovereign.  Hobbes distinguishes between inner and outer, between thought 
and act, between conscience and obedience.  The leviathan as a monstrous configuration of god, 
man, animal and machine safeguards the peace of a frightened people.  To achieve security, the 
leviathan demands absolute and unconditional obedience.  The power to require obedience from 
a subject is the warrant for the state’s sovereignty.  “Based on his sovereign power, he alone 
determines by law in questions of justice, what is right and proper and, in matters pertaining to 
religious beliefs, what is truth and error.”  Through law, the sovereign commands what is right.  
With this ability to enforce obedience, the sovereign also determines what is or is not a miracle.  
The significance of miracles spills into the political realm, where it has a “concrete, direct” 
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meaning.
47
  Auctoritas non Veritas – Authority, not truth – is the purview of the sovereign.  As a 
miracle is what the sovereign authority commands its subject to believe, once a sovereign 
declares miracles to cease, subjects are obligated to cease belief.
48
  
More than just miracles, to Schmitt, Hobbes’ sovereign possesses authority over 
confession by subjects.  By his power over confession the sovereign unifies politics and religion.  
Nevertheless, Hobbes’ undermines his state theory by weakening the sovereign’s power to 
demand public confession.  Because Hobbes differentiates between the private reason of the 
individual and the public reason of the state, he lays the groundwork for the eventual overthrow 
of the mortal god.
49
  The subject must obey the sovereign.  What he believes in his heart is of no 
public consequence.  A man’s heart, indecipherable as it is, can harbor whatever doubts it pleases 
about a sovereign’s command.  Here, private reason rules uncontested.  Once there is a public 
confession, the subject’s actions must align with the sovereign’s, as only the sovereign can 
profess truth.  
In Schmitt’s account this contrast between public and private reason has several 
consequences for Hobbes’ theory.  “The juristically (not theologically) constructed modern, 
individualistic right of freedom and thought embodied in the liberal constitutional state began 
here, as did the evolution of the state from one inherently void of substantive truth into a 
justifiable external power of the nineteenth and twentieth century.”50  Schmitt paints the 
transformation of Hobbes’ theory as an overturning of Hobbes’ intent by individualist 
philosophers like Spinoza.
51
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Hobbes’ state rests on the premise that it can guarantee peace for its subject and prevent 
the return to a state of nature.  Unconditional obedience is necessary.  Freedom of thought serves 
as a corollary, only if it remains private.  Pushed to the extreme, the modern liberal state arrives 
at the inverse: Individual freedom of thought begins the foundation for the modern state.  
Protection from the state of nature and absolute sovereignty of the state become secondary 
concerns, ‘mere provisos.’  The individual is now unchained and free.  
Schmitt expands on the effects of separating inner and outer: 
At precisely the moment when the distinction between inner and outer is recognized, the 
superiority of the inner over the outer and thereby that of the private over the public is 
resolved.  If public power and force be ever so emphatically recognized and loyally 
respected but only as a public external power, it is hollow and already dead from within.  
Such an earthly god has only the appearance and the simulacra of divinity on his side.  
Nothing divine lets itself be externally enforced.
52
 
 
Since the inner conscience is indeterminable, it now turns to a refuge, a retreat for those 
subjects who disagree with their sovereign, but recognize their incapacity to oppose it.  
Subterfuge becomes the modus operandi of the inchoate opposition, who band together and 
hatch plans for the slaying of the mortal god.  
Schmitt notes that those who appropriate myths are unable to harness them.  After their 
creation, myths gain autonomy, with no person in possession of their use or misuse.  “Neither 
textually or etymologically or in a conceptually systematic accuracy or as a mainstream of ideo-
historical logic has the last word on where the political fate of a mythical image resides been 
written.”  Breaking out of the mold cast by its author “The leviathan can unfold in unexpected 
historical situations and move in directions other than those plotted by its conjurer.”  Schmitt 
faults Hobbes for using a symbol that he is unaware is backed up by “the invisible forces of an 
old, ambiguous myth.”  By misappropriating the myth, Hobbes’ work is “overshadowed by the 
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leviathan, and all his clear intellectual constructions and arguments were overcome in the vortex 
created by the symbol he conjured up.”53  
 
Divided Interests, Divided State 
 By Schmitt’s estimation, Hobbes vitiates his political theory by using the leviathan because the 
path traced by the symbol conforms to the narrative of the Jewish myth referred to earlier in the 
passage.  The eschatological presumptions of the cabbalists, the ferocity of the world-historical 
battle between the Chosen Jews and their enemies, were parts of the myth ignored by Hobbes, 
which returned to haunt him.  Consequently, “That image was inadequate to the system of 
thought to which it was applied in historical reality and it perished as a result of its encounter 
with the forces arrayed behind the traditional Jewish interpretation of the leviathan.”54 
But what are these forces?  Schmitt claims that secret interest groups, not only secret 
societies, leveraged Hobbes’ allowance to destroy the state.55  These forces became powerful, 
and because they reside in the inner, they were much more dangerous and difficult to eradicate.  
“All the mythical forces embodied in the image of the leviathan now strike back at the state that 
Hobbes had symbolized.”  Schmitt maintains that the mortal god is slain by these groups and 
replaced by a lifeless machine.  The state transforms into a hapless tool of these feuding factions, 
parties and cults.  The myth of the divinity and omnipotence of the state implodes, supplanted by 
a functional, lifeless machine, unable to differentiate between the friends of the state and its 
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enemies.  “The new symbol left nothing to remind people of a huge man and a god created by 
human reason.”56  
In Schmitt’s elaborate sketch, Hobbes’ adversaries, the church and interest groups, 
reappear as forces of society.  They take advantage of the distinction between inner conscience 
and outward confession and end up as invisible powers that indirectly control the political arena.  
These invisible powers are available to direct the action of the state in other avenues beside 
politics – be it religion, culture, economy, or private whims.  This development troubles Schmitt.  
As he understands it, political power disperses within the state, but becomes so diffuse that no 
one can claim responsibility for any action or respond when an exception outside the norm 
occurs.  Schmitt explains: 
It is in the interest of an indirect power to veil the unequivocal relationship between state 
command and political danger, power and responsibility, protection and obedience, and 
the fact that the absence of responsibility associated with indirect rule allows the indirect 
powers to enjoy all the advantages and suffer none of the risks entailed in the possession 
of political power.
57
  
 
As can be seen from his engagement with Hobbes’ leviathan, Schmitt is interested in the 
cause of the instability of the liberal constitutional state.  During his lifetime, he had already 
witnessed the fall of the Weimar Republic and the Second Reich under Wilhelm II.  Schmitt 
settles on Hobbes because in him he sees the father of the modern state.
58
  Hobbes’ leviathan was 
picked from a biblical verse, a Jewish myth that overran its user.  Hobbes required unconditional 
obedience from a subject who was guaranteed protection by the sovereign.  By allowing the 
subject to privately question the sovereign’s motives or wisdom, Schmitt holds Hobbes liable for 
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the eventual demise of the liberal state.  Unscrupulous philosophers transformed the state from 
one maintaining order to one existing only to protect fundamental rights of liberty.  This was the 
avenue exploited by social groups who usurped legislative power, using the state as a tool to 
achieve various ends.  The state as machine is neutral with respect to these groups, making it 
dangerous and inherently unstable.  The state collapses from the internal dissension generated by 
them. 
  Ironically, the modern state, founded on liberal concepts and institutions, is destroyed 
by hidden forces within these same institutions.  The state is undermined by those it sets out to 
protect.  Indeed, “The leviathan, in the sense of the myth of the state as a huge machine, 
collapsed when the distinction was drawn between the state and individual freedom.”59 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Introduction 
The first part of the thesis dwelled on Schmitt’s interpretation of the Leviathan as a key to 
understanding Hobbes’ political theory.  By Schmitt’s account, Hobbes’ theory failed because 
the myth he used as its groundwork was unstable.  In the course of time, the leviathan, in the 
form of the machine of state, overpowered the leviathan embodied by the absolute sovereign. 
 The second part now proceeds to incorporate Schmitt’s analysis of the Leviathan into a 
synopsis of his thoughts on democracy.  In his introduction, Schmitt informs us that his book is a 
product of two lectures given in 1938.  Schmitt explains “Several thoughts and formulations 
taken from earlier articles and lectures have been incorporated into this work.”60  The attentive 
reader picks up the hint that this particular work is a pointer, a herald to his past thoughts on 
politics and the state.  Such a reader will supplement Schmitt’s Leviathan with his other texts.  In 
all, they retain a close affinity with Hobbes’ thought.  It will be seen that Schmitt’s democracy is 
radical because it attempts to split democracy from liberalism to get to its core, which is the 
originary identity of a mass of people.  From the radical democratic ideas of Schmitt can be 
traced his concept of the political and his critique of liberalism. 
 This part will begin with an elaboration of Hobbes’ theory of state.  The state of nature is 
the basis for the existence of the state.  However, before the state comes to being, a mass of 
individuals must make a contract, one that binds them together with interests extending beyond 
mere security.  
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Democracy and the State of Nature 
Schmitt depicts Hobbes’ theory of state in these terms: “A representative person is designated or 
a corporation comes into being by way of a covenant between individuals.  For its part the 
individual or corporation elevates those that entered into the covenant to a unified person, 
namely the state.”61  There are two movements occurring here.  For the first movement, 
individuals come together in a covenant to designate a representative entity.  With the second 
movement, the representative entity elevates the participants of the covenant to a state.  These 
events point to a question of sovereignty.  Where does power reside: Is it with the people or the 
state?  It is in answering this question that we see Schmitt as a radical democrat.  By proceeding 
along these lines we can return to his treatment of Hobbes.   
Hobbes explains that all men are inclined not only to procure, but also to assure 
themselves, a contented life.  These desires are amplified in the state of nature, where 
“Competition of riches, honor, command, or other power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and 
war; because the way of one competitor to the attaining of his is to kill, subdue, supplant, or 
repel the other.”  In this initial state of nature, everyone is equal, not in strength, nor in 
intelligence, but in ability to achieve favorable results in any endeavor.  “From this equality of 
ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends.  And therefore, if any two men desire 
the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way 
to their end . . . endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.”62  Men gauge the strength of their 
enemies and exploit opportunities to dispossess them of objects of mutual interests.  A David 
recognizes that he cannot fight Goliath alone, so he recruits his family to serve as support or 
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relies on his superior intellect and subterfuge.  Once the fight is over, the family members can 
return to ignoring each other, dispersing to their various sojourns.   
The desire for ease and sensual delight prompts men to obey a common power.  This is 
because “Fear of oppression disposeth a man to anticipate or to seek aid by society; for there is 
no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.”63  Therefore, for Schmitt, “the 
starting point of Hobbes’ construction of the state is fear of the state of nature.”  Schmitt 
continues, “In the state of nature, everyone can slay everyone else . . . .  In respect to posing and 
carrying out this threat all are equal . . . .  To this extent ‘democracy’ prevails in the state of 
nature.”64  What Schmitt alludes to is that his notion of democracy is not antithetical to the state 
of nature; democracy actually begins within this state.  
In opposition to the state of nature, where fear is palpable and existence depends on a 
clash of interests between individuals, Schmitt imagines “In the ‘civil,’ stately condition all 
citizens are secure in their physical existence; there reign peace, security and order.”  Schmitt 
hints at the state’s maintenance of order.  Whereas previous theories of the state appealed to 
institution by a god or discovery from nature, Hobbes declared the state to be fashioned by man 
for the sole purpose of guaranteeing peace and security.  Schmitt explains “The ingenuity of 
Hobbes’ theory of the state lies in the rejection of the ‘medieval conception of an existing 
commonwealth forged by God and of a preexistent natural order’ and replaces it with the 
‘product of human work,’ the result of a covenant made and executed by men.”  Schmitt 
continues, “The state as order and commonwealth is the product of human reason and human 
inventiveness and comes about by the virtue of the covenant.”65  
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 Schmitt ties the existence of the state to a preexisting covenant.  This is the foundation of 
Schmitt’s theory of democracy.  It begins with an original position of equality.  Individuals can 
only enter the covenant as equals.  If not, there would be a natural monarchy – the strongest 
would be king.  A covenant is unnecessary in an unequal society as a power already exists to 
maintain order.  
In chapter XIV of the Leviathan, Hobbes traces how the scattered mass of individuals 
obtains their sovereign representative.  Hobbes concedes that individuals have a right to preserve 
their lives with whatsoever means available, and yet, as a general rule, it is to the benefit of the 
individual to pursue peace and leave war as the last resort.  From this observation, he concludes 
“that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace and defense of himself he 
shall it necessary, to lay down the right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty 
against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.”66 
 Hobbes begins from absolute liberty in a state of nature to diminished liberty in a civil 
condition.  Peace is only achieved when each man renounces or transfers some part of his natural 
and unconditional right to self-preservation which would limit harm to others.  Hobbes’ 
considers such a transfer to be a selfish act, beneficial to the safety of the individual and 
necessary to the advancement of the community.  When these men gather together and mutually 
transfer their natural rights, they have entered into a social contract.
67
  
In Schmitt’s anarchic state of nature, these individuals then make a group.  Schmitt 
explains that “Fear brings atomized individuals together.  A spark of reason flashes and a 
consensus emerges about the necessity to submit to the highest power.”  By reason, the 
individuals decide on the cost of submitting to a higher power.  It is reason that drives these 
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individuals toward a consensus.  After all, no one needs to be convinced of the superiority of 
safety over peril.  It is at this moment that an identity of individuals in a group exists.  This is 
what Schmitt referred to as democracy.  It is obvious that Schmitt’s use of the term is 
idiosyncratic. 
This democratic identity as a group remains inert until the group transfers its security to 
another entity capable of maintaining law and order.  “The assemblage of men gathered together 
by the fright of fiends cannot, from the presuppositions of their gathering, overcome hostility.”  
Schmitt warns such consensus does not equal a state:  
The construction of the covenant, which enabled Hobbes to render a juristic interpretation 
of the sovereign representative person, did not suggest the totality of the state.  The 
indecisiveness that appears in the otherwise consistent train of Hobbes’ thought occurs at 
the juristically decisive point, an observation that has already been noted, namely, in the 
legal explanation of the foundation of the state as a covenant entered into by individuals.
68
 
 
 Indeed, the only way a common power can defend a group against foreigners is if all members 
of the group confer “their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that 
may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices unto one will.”  Schmitt is in accord with 
Hobbes who emphasizes that his agreement is “more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of 
them all, one and the same person, made by covenant of every with every man, in such manner 
as if every man should say to every man I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to 
this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and 
authorize all his actions in like manner.”69  
Democracy might be a starting point, yet it remains an inchoate form of social power, and 
nothing more.  As Schmitt puts it, “Even though a consensus of all with all has been achieved, 
this agreement is only an anarchio-social, not a state covenant.  What comes about as a result of 
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this social covenant, the sole guarantor of peace, the sovereign-representative person, does not 
come about as a result of but because of this consensus.”70  Schmitt claims that democracy can 
serve as handmaiden to almost any political form.  The people might affirm a monarchy, a 
parliamentary system, a class-based dictatorship without it being at odds with the democratic 
foundation, one based on an identity between the governing and the governed.    Schmitt 
explains, “A democracy can be militarist or pacifist, absolutist or liberal, centralized or 
decentralized, progressive or reactionary, and again different at different times without ceasing to 
be a democracy.”71   
To reiterate, Schmitt says “The sovereign-representative is much more than the sum total 
of all the participating particular wills.  To be sure, the accumulated anguish of individuals of 
who fear for their lives brings a new power into the picture: the leviathan.  But that affirms rather 
than creates this new god.”72  Schmitt, like Hobbes, is noncommittal about the particular political 
form a people can choose.   
 
Democracy, the Political and the State  
The identity spanning the governed and the governing cannot be taken as a matter of fact, but 
must be investigated further.  For Schmitt, that relationship is encapsulated in what he considered 
to be the defining characteristic of a political existence.  
 In a description of the copperplate engraving in Hobbes’ Leviathan, Schmitt says “The 
political battle, with its inevitable and incessant friend-enemy disputes that embrace every sphere 
of human activity, brings to the fore on both sides specific weapons.”  The illustrations of 
fortresses and cannons by Abraham Bosse “correspond to the contrivances and intellectual 
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methods of the other side, whose fighting ability is by no means inferior.”73  From the first page 
of Leviathan, Schmitt advances, “The important realization that ideas and distinctions are 
political weapons, in fact, specific weapons of wielding ‘indirect’ power.”  Schmitt contends that 
the friend-enemy distinction, the foundation of the political, pervades all areas of human activity.  
The enemy, in this case, is at least an intellectual equal, one capable of advancing and 
maintaining powerfully dangerous ideas and disguising the form and ends of its power.   
Schmitt originally used the ‘friend-and-enemy grouping’ in The Concept of the Political.  
This is Schmitt’s first pointer to a text beyond his Leviathan.  The cornerstone of Schmitt’s 
political theory, The Concept of the Political, is essential to any exegesis of Leviathan.  Ernst-
Wolfgang Bockenforde  advances “The central message as well as the academic significance of 
Schmitt’s concept of the political can be seen in the fact that it focuses on the phenomenological 
criterion not of politics but of ‘the political’ or, more precisely, the degrees of intensity within 
the political.  To know and recognize this criterion is a precondition to any meaningful political 
action.”74 
 Schmitt opens the text with a provocative statement: “The concept of the state 
presupposes the concept of the political.”75  The statement implies the political is prior to the 
state.  If the state is a modern creation, a descendant, or a replacement, of other political entities 
such as the Greek polis, the Islamic kingdoms, and commonwealths of the medieval period, then 
one is hard pressed to equate the political with the state.  There were stateless societies that were 
immensely political.
76
  Schmitt considers the equation of the state and the political accurate only 
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when the state possesses a monopoly on politics, which in this sense means that the state stands 
above society or opposes it as an antithesis.  However, Schmitt notes, “The equation state = 
politics becomes erroneous and deceptive at exactly the moment when state and society penetrate 
each other.  What had been up to that point affairs of state become thereby social matters, and, 
vice versa, what had been purely social matters become affairs of state . . . .  Heretofore 
ostensibly neutral domains – religion, culture, education, the economy – then cease to be neutral 
in the sense that they do not pertain to state and to politics.”77  When the state seeps into the 
society what emerges is a total state that allows the political to flourish from any domain.  This 
total state retains a monopoly on politics; more importantly it now possesses the Midas touch – 
anything it handles turns political.  
Schmitt attempts a definition of the political when he notes that “The specific political 
distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and 
enemy.”  Schmitt, however, retreats from asserting the definition as comprehensive, noting 
instead that it is only a “definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition, 
or one indicative of substantial content.”78  He explains “The distinction between friend and 
enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or 
dissociation.”  The political proves independent of other normative criteria of morality, of 
economics, aesthetics, legality or religion.  It is not based on these domains and its criteria 
cannot be transferred to other domains and vice versa.  Schmitt adds that, “If the antithesis of 
good and evil is not simply identical with that of beautiful and ugly, profitable and unprofitable, 
and cannot be directly reduced to the others, then the antithesis of friend and enemy must even 
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less be confused with or mistaken for the others.  The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the 
utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation.” 
Wherever a gathering of like-minded individuals exist, there rests the possibility that it 
might transform itself into the political.  An association is not political because it is a political 
party – even some political parties are not political, insofar as they claim to be universal and 
thereby refuse to recognize enemies – it emerges as political once the bond linking individuals 
within it is strong enough to potentially establish a distinction between friends and enemies.  
Bockenforde explains “The political does not consist in a determined sphere of objects, but 
rather is a public relationship between people, a relationship marked by specific degree of 
association or dissociation which can potentially lead to the distinction between friend and 
enemy; the content underlying this relationship can originate from any sphere or area of human 
life.”79   
If the political involves the differentiation of friends and enemies, the question presents 
itself: Who is the enemy, and who is a friend?  Schmitt’s answer is “An enemy exists only when, 
at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.”  This 
definition provides the nexus between Schmitt’s concept of the political and his idea on identity.  
A ‘collectivity of people’ points to the fact that ‘the people’ can only be identified as a singular 
entity, and not as a mass of individuals.  The enemy must also be a singular entity and a public 
one as well, opposed to another collectivity of men, and potentially inimical to their way of life.  
Schmitt emphasizes that “The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a 
relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by 
virtue of such a relationship.”  The enemy can therefore be viewed as existential; until a 
confrontation emerges, it remains absent and unnoticed.   
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By his concept of the political Schmitt shows how the collectivity of people can be 
elevated to the state.  Because the state is the preeminent organized political entity in the 
contemporary age, it decides by itself the friend-and-enemy distinction.
80
  The caveat still 
remains that the two are not interchangeable.  It has not always been the case that state 
established or maintained this distinction.   
Even before the historical emanation of the state, the primordial organizations of 
individuals identified what brought them together and what could potentially tear them apart.  
“The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer 
to the real possibility of physical killing.  War follows from enmity.  War is the existential 
negation of the enemy.”  War is fought to preserve a collective identity, not merely to avenge a 
seeming slight.  If a man kills his enemy, it is murder, a crime deserving of punishment.  
Consequently, the possibility of war is the reason that the political cannot be founded on an 
individual basis.  “Never in the thousand-year struggle between Christians and Muslims did it 
occur to a Christian to surrender rather than defend Europe out of love toward the Saracens or 
Turks,” Schmitt asserts.  “The enemy in the political sense need not be hated personally, and in 
the private sphere only does it make sense to love one’s enemy, i.e., one’s adversary.”81   
War is not praiseworthy, neither is it desirable or even necessary.  Nevertheless, once 
enmity surfaces, there is the potential that it could ignite and expand beyond its immediate 
domain.  Schmitt does not luxuriate in war; at times he puts on the guise of a doctor delivering 
bad news.  Contrary to several of his interpreters who believe that he aesthetizes violence as the 
essence of politics, Schmitt says “War is neither the aim, nor the purpose nor even the very 
content of politics.  But as an ever present possibility it is the leading presupposition which 
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determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically 
political behavior.” 82 
Schmitt asserts, “Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand and 
judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict.  Each participant is in a 
position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and 
therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s own form of existence.”83  The 
level of intensity determining friends and enemies is expressed by their willingness to fight to 
preserve that distinction.  That is why the political “can neither be decided by a previously 
determined general norm nor by the judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral party.”  A 
previous norm is unable to establish an association, is in no position to distinguish friends from 
enemies, and has no legal effect.  Meanwhile, at the point of highest intensity, no party to a 
conflict can be neutral; once an association is formed, everyone is aligned either for or against it.  
“If a part of the population declares that it no longer recognizes enemies, then, depending on the 
circumstance, it joins their side and aids them.  Such a declaration does not abolish the reality of 
the friend-and-enemy distinction.”84 
All questions of sovereignty are answered only within the political.  Schmitt remarks, “If 
such an entity exists at all, it is always the decisive entity and it is sovereign in the sense that the 
decision about the critical situation, even if it is the exception, must always necessarily reside 
here.”  Given that war emanates from the distinction of friend and enemies, this critical situation 
reveals sovereignty.  The sovereign entity typically establishes the ultimate distinction and is 
thereby the decisive entity, even though the sources for the distinction may differ.  Friends and 
                                                          
82
 See Wolin, The Conservative Revolutionary Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror; Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt and 
the Road to Abu Ghraib ; CP 34. 
83
 CP 27. 
84
 CP 51. 
 37   
 
enemies change after all, their very nature depending on the reason for the conflict.
85
  In most 
instances this sovereignty belongs to the state.  Schmitt points out, “The state as the decisive 
political entity possesses an enormous power: The possibility of waging war and thereby 
publicly disposing of the lives of men.”86  
 
On the Absence of Resistance to the Civil State 
Schmitt extends the concept of the enemy, from purely an external basis to include the domestic 
front.  If peace is the end of the state, then enemies identified, from within and beyond, must be 
eliminated.  “As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels 
it in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy.”  Lest we forget, Schmitt reminds 
us “Not the representation by a person, but the factual, current accomplishment of genuine 
protection is what the state is all about.”87 
By emphasizing peace to be the most important criterion for a properly functioning state, 
Schmitt and Hobbes downplay and even deny the existence of a right of rebellion within the 
state.  Hobbes imagines that the unity producing the sovereign leaves no right for individual or 
collective resistance.  As “the right of bearing the person of them all is given to him they make 
sovereign by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can happen 
no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any 
pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection.”88  The agreement between every man 
and every man is a contract, which Hobbes describes as “the mutual transferring of right.”  
Within the contract, the sovereign is absent, nonexistent, and, most importantly, is not party to 
                                                          
85
 CP 38,  43. 
86
 CP 46. 
87
 LST 34. 
88
 Hobbes 111. 
 38   
 
the terms.  The contract is the basis for creating the identity of the collectivity of the people.  At 
this point, the people abandon some of their natural right to self-preservation in exchange for 
unanimity within the collectivity.   
After the contract, there is a covenant between the collectivity and the sovereign who 
now appears from without.  Hobbes differentiates a contract from a covenant by noting that “one 
of the contractors may deliver the thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform 
his part at some determinate time after (and in the meantime be trusted).”89  If the former event 
could be considered immediate, the latter can be taken as dynamic process.  By designating the 
covenant to follow the contract, Hobbes severs the direct connection between the people and 
their sovereign.  The people promise total obedience to the sovereign, who likewise promises to 
protect them from external and internal enemies.  However, no particular individual agreed to the 
terms of the covenant.  Rather, the sovereign agreed to the terms with the people as a whole.  The 
sovereign has no contact with the covenanters, so he is not required to guarantee protection.  The 
sovereign justifies himself. 
Hobbes’ weak point is that he is unable to give a suitable account of how individuals in a 
state of nature make a contract in the first place.  Hobbes notes that “the force of word being (as I 
have formerly noted) too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants, there are in 
man’s nature but two imaginable helps to strengthen it.  And those are either a fear of the 
consequence of breaking their word, or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it.”  
Neither sentiment can be counted upon within this fractious state.  Indeed, Hobbes had earlier 
identified in man’s nature “three principal causes of quarrel: first, competition; secondly, 
diffidence; thirdly, glory.” 90  By implying that the propensity for violence and incivility lies in 
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man’s very nature, Hobbes cannot make a convincing case why men should congregate and give 
up some of their rights.  Even if it could be imagined that a rational case could be made by an 
individual, such a transaction would have to be based on trust – a commodity in short supply. 
 Schmitt rectifies this slight discrepancy in Hobbes’ theory.  For Schmitt the collectivity 
originates with a contract between men, when they determine what their identity is and what the 
connecting bonds which unite them are.  The contract specifies that individuals suspend the right 
to protect themselves by any means necessary, as well as gives them the impetus to fight other 
factions as a group, if their identity is threatened.  This gathering is not a state.  It only becomes 
so when there is a covenant between the people and the representative person, where the person 
promises protection to the group in exchange for unconditional obedience.  Just like Hobbes, 
Schmitt’s covenant does not give a right of resistance to the individual because a failure to 
establish order on the part of the sovereign means sovereignty no longer exists and the state has 
returned to a state of nature.  Any act of rebellion in a well-ordered state is a crime against the 
state and is punishable by the laws determined by the state.  Such a position presents a paradox.  
As Schmitt explains, “To create tranquility, security, and order and thereby establish the normal 
situation is the prerequisite for legal norms to be valid.  Every norm presupposes a normal 
situation, and no norm can be valid in an entirely abnormal situation.”91  The only legitimate, not 
even legal, time to rebel will be when the state no longer exists. 
Schmitt therefore considers all rights to resistance implied in medieval conceptions of the 
commonwealth as nonexistent for the modern state.  “The endeavor to resist the leviathan, the 
all-powerful, resistance-destroying and technically perfect mechanism of command, is 
practically impossible . . . .  There are no points of departure for a right to resist, irrespective of 
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whether it is an objective or a subjective right.”92  Schmitt argues that all law is subject to the 
sovereign, so in an objective sense the state cannot will against itself if it will lead to 
nonexistence.  The leviathan exists as a state and “In that case it functions as an irresistible 
instrument of quietude, security and order and has all objective and all subjective rights on its 
side because, as the sole and highest lawgiver it makes all the laws or it does not exist and 
therefore cannot fulfill its function as the defender of peace.”  Schmitt argues for a unified 
sovereign, one who is the giver, the executor and the interpreter of the law.  Any division of 
power, in form of a balance, or through confrontation, weakens the state by denying the 
sovereign the tools he needs to maintain order. 
The individual cannot resist because as part of a consensual group – the seed of the state 
itself – he is incapable of resisting himself.  Within this framework only one option exists: he 
renounces the identity that connects his individuality to the group.  Nevertheless, even this act is 
not resistance as all that it does is mark the individual as an outcast, a stateless being.  Of such a 
man, Aristotle remarks “He must be either a lower animal or a god.” 93 
 
The Inner/Outer Distinction and the Rise of the Constitutional State 
Schmitt’s dismissal of rebellion against the state was part of his attempt to support his critique of 
certain liberal aspects of the constitutional state.  He observes that the leviathan suffered a fate 
Hobbes never foresaw: its destruction by elements within the state.
94
  As a rational construction, 
the state can take irrational paths in its continual growth or eventual demise.  During Hobbes’ 
time, the state was represented by the absolute prince.  This arrangement lasted until the liberal 
distinction was made between an outer expression of obedience and an inner right to conscience.  
                                                          
92
 LST 46. 
93
 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a. 
94
 LST 38. 
 41   
 
Schmitt maintains that “The question of faith and miracle” was the state’s misfortune.  Schmitt 
believes that liberalism killed off the state as the preeminent political entity by elevating law 
above personal authority, as well as the universalized liberty of the individual above the binding 
norms of the localized community. 
Schmitt traces the beginning of the state’s downfall to Hobbes’ skepticism about 
miracles.  “Hobbes’ position on the especially sensitive question of the belief in miracles was 
purely agnostical.  He maintained that nobody can know for certain whether an occurrence is or 
is not a miracle.”95  Hobbes sets a high standard for what can be considered a miracle.  In the 
Leviathan, Hobbes says “And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a miracle, we must 
both see it done and use all means possible to consider whether it be such as no man can do the 
like by his natural power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God.”96  Earlier in the text, 
Hobbes argued that God cannot be a body, since if the cause of sense is the external body, or 
object, which affects the organ related to each sense, it would imply an admission to God’s 
finitude.  Consequently, no prophet exists who can assert that he speaks to God directly.  There is 
no recourse to the supernatural in understanding miracles; all a person needs is greater 
knowledge of bodies and how they interact. 
Moreover, because miracles are inexplicable except by supernatural knowledge, a miracle 
is what the sovereign – Hobbes calls them God’s lieutenants – in his capacity as protector of the 
land, says it is.  The sovereign, as the embodiment of public reason, determines what a miracle 
is; once such a ruling is given, no room is admitted for appeal.  Hobbes tells us that in questions 
related to miracles, “we are not every one to make our own private reason or conscience, but the 
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public reason (that is, the reason of god’s supreme lieutenant), judge.”97  Of this authority, 
Schmitt notes, “Sovereign power has thus achieved its zenith.  It is God’s highest representative 
on earth.”98 
Unfortunately, at this point of supreme power, at the confluence of religion and politics, 
Schmitt explains that sovereign unity ruptures with the distinction between miracles and beliefs.  
Hobbes might have declared, “The question of wonder and miracle to be a matter of ‘public’ in 
contrast to ‘private reason’,” but as a believer in the universal freedom of thought, Schmitt 
asserts Hobbes permits the individual his skepticism, as long as it is unvoiced.  Indeed, Hobbes 
says, “A private man has always the liberty (because thought is free) to believe or not believe, in 
his heart, those acts that have been given out for miracles, according as he shall see what benefit 
can accrue, by men’s belief, to those that pretend or countenance them, and thereby conjecture 
whether they be miracles or lies.”  Nevertheless, Hobbes concedes that “when it comes to 
confession of that faith, the private reason must submit to the public, that is to say, to God’s 
lieutenant.” 99   
To legitimize the sovereign, Hobbes says that public reason is the supreme judge because 
“We have given him a sovereign power to do all that is necessary for our peace and defense.”  
Wars can be fought over the interpretation of miracles, therefore to preserve peace within the 
state; the sovereign has the sole power to determine what a miracle is.  An example Hobbes gives 
is the Eucharist.  If a man delivers an incantation over a loaf of bread and a cup of wine, then 
calls these items the flesh and blood of a living man, of a living God, one is apt to take such 
person as deranged.  Were the state to make the same assertion, no one can outwardly deny it to 
be so.  Hobbes leaves a gap for those who challenge the veracity of the state’s claims.  The 
                                                          
97
 Hobbes 300. 
98
 LST 55. 
99
 LST 56, Hobbes 300. 
 43   
 
truthfulness of transubstantiation can only be doubted in silence.  Schmitt says that this 
allowance paves the way for the eventual rise of the modern state.  In Schmitt’s view, “The 
distinction between private and public, faith and confession, fides and confessio, is introduced in 
a way from which everything else was logically derived in the century that ensured until the rise 
of the liberal constitutional state.”  
Schmitt takes issue with the constitutional state because he sees it as the triumph of the 
leviathan as mechanism over the leviathan as the sovereign representative.  
The distinction of inner and outer became for the mortal god a sickness unto death.  But 
his work, the state, survived him in the form of a well-organized executive, army, and 
police as well as administrative and judicial apparatuses and a well-working, 
professionally trained bureaucracy.  To an increasing extent the state was perceived as a 
mechanism and a machine.  As that perception became widespread so did the 
development of the concepts of right and law.
100
 
 
The appellation ‘constitutional state,’ Schmitt believes, is purely a polemical construct.  
“Hidden here under the name ‘constitutional state’ is a legal system that is based on a 
‘constitution’ made by men, one that operates with written laws, especially codified laws.  In 
reality, the bourgeois constitutional state is a state based on law.”  Schmitt emphasizes the 
bourgeois aspect of the modern state because he believes all states are constitutional states by the 
very fact they have been made and are independent.  If every state is founded on a covenant, then 
“Every state is also a constitutional state because within the confines of a state extralegal laws or 
laws aimed against the state cannot exist.”101  Political representation carries with it 
responsibilities, which can only be achieved within the political.  The formation of an order 
already imbues it with its own legality; its legitimacy is tied to the fact it is capable of creating its 
order.  The moment of creation of a state is also the moment of its constitution.  Therefore, 
having the adjective ‘constitutional’ before state is superfluous, insofar as it identifies what is 
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already innate to the state.  The term ‘constitutional,’ actually points to limited government, a 
position Schmitt rejects because the constitution cannot be supreme. The constitution does not 
create the state; once the state is created, it is constitutional.  
The constitutional state, in other words, is the triumph of legality against legitimacy.  By 
Schmitt’s reading of Hobbes, the state is the result of a covenant of all-with-all, a democratic 
consensus.  The state formed is constitutional, democratic individuals constitute it.  On the other 
hand, a constitutional state requires a constituent assembly, a form of representation, once 
removed from the people.  Schmitt maintains that “Only a state established by such a constituent 
national assembly is constitutionally a law-and-constitutional state.”  The difference between a 
‘constitutional’ state and every other state is that the former is run by written law.  By instituting 
private rights, which then became part of the law through inclusion in the constitution, Hobbes 
became “a spiritual forefather of the bourgeois law-and-constitutional state that materialized in 
the nineteenth century on the continent of Europe.”102  
 
Liberalism and Pluralism within the Constitutional State 
Once the inner is separated from the outer, the absolute free individual is created.  This creation 
assumes powers greater than those of the state.  Freedom of thought grants the individual 
unheard of powers, because the state cannot enforce what goes on in the individual’s heart.  
“Historically considered ‘privatization’ had its origin in religion.  The first right of the individual 
in the sense of the bourgeois social order was the freedom of religion.”103  Once religion was 
privatized, anything else could be privatized, from conscience, to association, to press, even 
trade, because “whatever place is assigned to religion, it always and everywhere manifests its 
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capacity to absolutize.  If religion is a private matter, it also follows that privacy is revered.”  By 
this event, Schmitt intimates that if “Public power and force may be ever so completely and 
emphatically recognized and ever so loyally respected, but only as a public and only on external 
power, it is hollow and already dead from within.”104  By granting individual rights the 
constitution has killed the state.  
Schmitt explains the importance of the distinction between inner and outer:  
If looked at from the perspective of constitutional history, a dual beginning was made 
here: first, the juristically (not theologically) constructed beginning of modern, 
individualistic right of freedom of thought and conscience and thereby the characteristic 
individual freedoms embodied in the structure of the liberal constitutional state; and, 
second, the evolution of the state from one inherently void of substantive truth into a 
justifiable external power.
105
 
 
Once the freedom of conscience is admitted, then “general legalization is the main feature of this 
development, and the state itself changes into a positivist system of legality.”106  In Schmitt’s 
account, the constitutional state and its dependence on written law masks the fact that the 
absolutist states of the 17
th
 century were also bound by law.  For every subject, civil laws are 
“those rules which the commonwealth hath commanded him (by word, writing, or other 
sufficient sign of the will) to make use of, for the distinction of right and wrong, that is to say, of 
what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule.”107  Whatever the sovereign commands 
becomes law and must be obeyed.  The constitutional state radicalizes this notion of law to “tame 
the leviathan.”  
To protect its subjects, the state requires unlimited obedience to its commands 
promulgated through law.  Initially, the state made the law, interpreted it, and enforced it as it 
saw fit.  All these powers were concentrated in the sovereign.  Hobbes confirms this relationship 
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when he notes, “The sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an assembly, or one man, is not subject 
to the civil laws.”108  His analysis is that the state has power to enact and repeal laws, including 
those that are offensive to it.  A state capable of changing laws according to its prerogative 
cannot be bound by them.  The laws as applicable in the constitutional state, envisioned by the 
tenets of liberalism, deny the state its elevation over the constitution.  It shrinks the power of the 
state over the individual and it makes the state subservient to law.  
In order to protect the individual, sovereign power within the government is divided up 
among distinct executive, legislative and judicial branches.  In diagnosing what weakens a 
commonwealth, Hobbes explains “There is a sixth doctrine plainly and directly against the 
essence of a commonwealth, and it is this: that the sovereign power may be divided.  For what is 
it to divide the power of a commonwealth, but to dissolve it; for powers divided mutually destroy 
each other.”109  Schmitt builds on the critique, noting that the notion of a balance of powers 
brings to mind a spring balance and further points to the idea of a state as a mechanism.  The 
sovereign-representative cannot guarantee protection; it requires “an effectively functioning 
mechanism of command.”110  The police might be an arm of the leviathan, but to work properly 
it must be disengaged from the sovereign.  “The leviathan thus becomes none other than a huge 
machine, a gigantic mechanism in the service of ensuring the physical protection of those 
governed.”  The executive assumes itself to be the de facto political entity, choosing friends and 
enemies, but in reality, power is handed over to the legislature.   
The covenant setting up the state was made by individuals, but only within a consensus of 
shared interests; by positing the supremacy of the individual, liberalism aborts the state’s ability 
to maintain order, secure peace, and sustain the livelihood of its citizens.  The state quits the 
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political, because its ability to decide on friends and enemies is hampered, and it has already 
relinquished to the individual the power to sacrifice one’s life for the benefit of the community.  
What begins as individual rights extends beyond individuals to larger groups, which then 
form alliances; the private sphere transforms into a social one.  Special interests and indirect 
powers seize the political process to further their own agenda.  Political parties, churches, trade 
unions and social organizations manipulate the legislative arm of government.  Once individual 
rights are enshrined in the constitution, they extend to more than individuals.  The private sphere 
becomes pluralistic, with different powers advancing legislation to their profit.
111
  These groups 
grow powerful, yet they veil their influence on the political process, making them more 
dangerous to the state and less accountable to its citizens.   
According to Schmitt, “Party pluralism has perpetrated the destruction of the state by 
using methods inherent in the liberal law state . . . .  That happened when the organizations of 
individual freedom were used like knives by anti-individualistic forces to cut up the leviathan 
and divide his flesh among themselves.”  Schmitt faults pluralism derived from liberalism 
because it makes the state hostage to various interest groups.  Schmitt paints a picture in which 
the state appears “if not altogether the servant of instrument of a dominant class or party, to have 
become the mere product of an equilibrium between several conflicting groups, at most pouvoir 
neutre and intermediary, a neutral mediator, a moment of equilibrium between the conflicting 
groups, a kind of clearing house, a peacemaker.”112  Under these conditions, the state is 
incapable of making a decision on political issues, lest it offend a powerful interest group.  
Schmitt says the old adversaries of the state,  
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[T]he ‘indirect’ powers of the church and of interest groups reappeared . . .  as modern 
political parties, trade unions, social organizations, in a word as ‘forces of society.’  They 
seized the legislative arms of parliament and the law state and thought they had placed the 
leviathan in harness.  Their ascendancy was facilitated by a constitutional system that 
enshrined a catalog of individual rights.
113
   
 
These entities realize that it is easier to control the lawmaking process for their own benefit.  
 
In the state of nature everyone fights everyone else.  Individuals gather together, create an 
identity for themselves, and accept the representation of a higher power.   
This sovereign-representative guarantees protection and order and begins to rule.  With the 
mechanization of politics, the legislative/law-enforcement strands of the state are separated from 
the executive.  Schmitt isolates the state-forming and state-ruling moments from Hobbes, as well 
as the succession of politics by law.  It is at this point, that “Hobbes’ concept of the state became 
an essential factor in the four-hundred-year-long process of mechanization, a process that, with 
the aid of technical development, brought about the general ‘neutralization’ and especially the 
transformation of the state into a technically neutral instrument.”114 
Schmitt is dismayed by what he terms the ‘technization’ of the state, what he sees as its 
value-and-truth neutrality.  In matters of life and death, in situations that involve the essential 
nature or identity of the governed, the state cannot be neutral, or at least should not be.  The state 
thereby abandons its primary function, weakened by its inability and unwillingness to decide 
between friends and enemies.  The sovereign, rendered powerless by law, watches idly as the 
state relinquishes all hold on truth, right and virtue.  “All other concepts of truth and justice are 
absorbed by decisions promulgated in legal commands.”115 
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CONCLUSION 
Schmitt notes that “Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals 
equal but unequals will be treated unequally.”  Equality must rest on a substance and not 
arithmetic calculations.  Religious convictions, ideas of nation, tribal affiliations or race can 
serve as substances of equality and homogeneity.  Schmitt also contends that “a democracy – 
because inequality always belongs to equality – can exclude one part of those governed without 
ceasing to be a democracy.”  That in fact, “until now people who in some way completely or 
partially without rights and who were restricted from the exercise of political power, let them be 
called barbarians, uncivilized, atheists, aristocrats, counterrevolutionaries, or even slaves, have 
belonged to a democracy.”116  In other words, democracy is not about numbers or universal 
political rights.  Blacks and Indians might not have voted in Apartheid South Africa, more 
importantly, the Afrikaans were the minority, yet neither condition stopped the state from being 
democratic. 
Schmitt draws the tension between the equality identified by democracy and that 
espoused by liberalism.  Schmitt says, “The equality of all persons as persons is not democracy 
but a certain kind of liberalism, not a state form but an individualistic-humanitarian ethic and 
weltanschauung.  Modern mass democracy rests on the confused combination of both.”117  The 
liberal aspects of mass democracy ensured the adoption of closed ballot voting, universal 
suffrage, political parties, as well as separation of powers.  The reasoning is that closed ballots 
protect an individual’s right to free expression, while universal suffrage proceeds from a belief in 
the natural equality of all men.  Political parties spring up under the rubric of group interests, 
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while a division and balance of power aims to pit interest against interest – the concentration of 
power in one branch being considered dangerous to the security of individual rights. 
Radical democracy, as conceived by Schmitt, opposes liberalism.   
The unanimous opinion of one hundred million private persons is neither the will of the 
people nor public opinion.  The will of the people can be expressed just as well and 
perhaps better through acclamation, than through something taken for granted, an obvious 
or unchallenged presence, than through the statistical apparatus that has been constructed 
with such meticulousness in the last 50 years.  The stronger the power of democratic 
feeling, the more certain is the awareness that democracy is something other than a 
registration system for secret ballots.
118
 
 
This ‘obvious and unchallenged presence,” this democratic identity, needs no separation of 
powers.  “In a democracy, where those who command and those who obey are identical, the 
sovereign, that is, an assembly composed of all citizens, can change laws and change 
constitutions at will.”119  
 The rise of the machine of state and the collapse of the sovereign representative can be 
attributed to the liberal aspects of modern democracy.  The crisis of modern democracy springs 
from “the contradiction of a liberal individualism burdened by moral pathos and a democratic 
sentiment governed essentially by political ideals.”120 
 In looking at Schmitt’s ideas of democracy and his reaction to liberalism, some 
supporting points can be acknowledged.  Schmitt reemphasizes the agonistic foundation of the 
modern state by returning to the people, not as philosophical abstraction, but as a concrete, 
politically active entity.  Furthermore, he identifies the adaptability of democracy to various 
governing forms. 
 By positing the political as the distinction between friends and enemies, Schmitt explains 
the viability of the modern state.  As the guarantor of our peace and security, the state possesses 
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the authority to make the political distinction.  Even if the state functions mainly to preserve our 
individual and collective rights, its foundation is grounded in conflict.  Moral ideals are 
worthless if one is unwilling to fight for them.  An example Schmitt gives concerns pacifist 
hostility toward war.  If pacifists feel strongly enough about stopping war, they will have to fight 
to do so.  By this point, they have become political and can form a state. 
 The concept of the political rediscovers the people as the fundamental political entity 
manifested in history as a concrete identity.  The people as a collectivity are democratic.  The 
universal adoption of modern democracy disregards this fact in the face of history.  After all, on 
what basis can one claim that modern democratic practices can be adopted in a feudal society?  
Schmitt explains, “For radical democrats democracy as such has its own value without reference 
to the content of the politics pursued.  If the danger exists that democracy might be used in order 
to defeat democracy, then a radical democrat has to decide whether to remain a democrat against 
the majority or give up his position.”121 In other words, democracy is suitable only for people 
who are democratic.  Democracy can abide with various forms of government amenable and 
preferable with the people.  It may be socialist, communist, liberal or even a dictatorship.  Since 
democracy is at heart, a political form, and not a form of government it does not specify how an 
election should be set, how suffrage should be exercised or what the branches of government 
may be, and what powers they may have.  Democracy ultimately rests on an identity. 
 Nevertheless, Schmitt’s radical democracy still presents certain conceptual difficulties.  
First, radical democracy is conceived within a liberal framework, so it is conceivable to consider 
conflicting interests as integral to democracy. Second, the identity of a people is not static.  It is 
dynamic, changing in substance and form within history. 
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 Schmitt is unable to escape the liberal foundation inherent in his ideal democracy.  By 
following Hobbes, Schmitt begins with autonomous individuals entering into a contract.  These 
free individuals are the kernel for the liberal idea of man as a free being.  Even if such an 
individual enters a contract, this individuality is not dissolved, but rather is enhanced.  Men did 
not enter into a contract to be indistinguishable from their peers; instead, the contract provides 
the freedom to exercise their uniqueness.  This means that Hobbes’ distinction between inner 
conscience and outer confession is not an oversight.  It is a consequence of the initial conditions 
within the imagined state of nature.  
 Therefore, Schmitt’s historical diagram showing how the distinction led to the rise of the 
constitutional state, while logically consistent, ends with the wrong conclusion.  When Schmitt 
claims that in defending the natural unity of spiritual and secular power, Hobbes “opened the 
door for a contrast to emerge because of religious reservation regarding private belief and thus 
paved the way for new more dangerous kinds and forms of indirect powers,” the question to ask 
is: Could the door ever be shut?  If answered in the negative, then perhaps modern democracy is 
not a contradiction, but merely an inherently unstable edifice.  Unless Schmitt argues that the 
collectivity is natural, like the Aristotelian polis, then it is surmised that the free individual lies at 
the core of his theory.  
Moreover, if individuals are left to pursue their own well-being in what way they desire, 
they will generate different interests, not all of them harmful to the existence of the state.  Once 
the state has designated by law what is legal or illegal, an individual or group is free to operate as 
long as it does not run afoul of those laws.  Schmitt is so terrified by the threat of civil war that 
he shortchanges the importance of pluralism to the life of the state.  The economic, intellectual 
and political flourishing of the state are products of the various interests clashing and 
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compromising, and not the result of an enforced, organic unanimity actually which eventually 
leads to sterility. 
Also, even if the state begins as a democracy with a particular identity in history, this 
identity is dynamic and can change with time.  Some of the political changes Schmitt criticized 
resulted from alterations in the way the society viewed itself.  A state founded only on the 
interests of land-holding white adults can imagine itself to be a better, more moral state, one 
more interested in securing the well-being of the less privileged within it.  In that case, the state 
could expand the suffrage to include women and persons of other races.  The state is still 
democratic, only the substance of the identity had changed.  Schmitt’s theory is mired in the 
origin of the state; he lacks the political imagination to see how the state exists in history. 
An absence of political imagination exhibits itself in a less benign sense.  A state might 
discover and change its historical mission with inconceivable results.  Nazi Germany succeeded 
Weimar Germany, and in addition to geographical expansion, it promoted the extermination of 
undesirables within the state.  When Schmitt urged the preservation of an unspecified 
homogeneity, and if necessary, the eradication of heterogeneity, as the basis of democracy, he 
should have realized that such statements could be and were taken at face value.  He built part of 
the intellectual apparatus for the Nazi state; his concept of the political became a rallying cry for 
a people who believed they were surrounded on all sides by enemies hell-bent on their 
destruction.  He therefore is complicit in the death of millions during the Second World War.  
A possible lesson that can be learned from Schmitt’s theory of radical democracy is that political 
ideas can have drastic historical consequences.  Another is that theories of politics which begin 
with a pessimistic conception of human nature usually end up confirming these assumptions 
once they are put in practice. 
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